improved trade and benign hope for the are more inclusive global structure.
Following the death of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping's embrace of reform and opening changed our calculus of the stakes and outcome. We enthusiastically launched a CIDA development program aimed at providing the software of a modern market economy and building linkages with China through educational institutions that we hoped would help to transform Chinese society in our image. Such hopes at the state-to-state level were shattered by the events at Tian'anmen in 1989, but our focus on the human dimension of interaction kept our doors open and persuaded us to resume our aid programme soon after. For the last quarter of the Twentieth century Canada expended a significant effort into bringing China into international society. Once Deng Xiaoping opened China's door and began the process of market reform Canada took a lead in assisting China's efforts to "link rails to the world" not just through bilateral and multilateral engagement but through a targeted policy of international assistance.
Informally, the initial floating of an aid program was communicated as a return, a kind of kickback on the mounting trade surpluses Canada had accumulated through years of wheat sales. Logically, assistance in developing the infrastructure of a market economy would assist China in developing its own trade and investment strategy to reverse its chronic trade deficit.
At the same time this fit the pattern of Canada's Grand Strategy by working to integrate China into the institutional and normative framework of "embedded liberalism". 4 The bulk of our development assistance was channeled into training, much of it training of officials in managing the market economy, foreign investment and trade, as well as assistance in developing legal codes, legal and judicial systems connected with a market economy. Poverty reduction, gender and minority rights were also a focus, but all of this came in the context of a shock to bilateral relations but the general trend of assistance to China's reform and opening up resumed relatively quickly.
A Limited Role in Security
It has long been an axiom of Canada's middle power role that the Canadian contribution to the major questions of balance of power is marginal. Even though it had the technical means to become a nuclear power, Canada very early on determined not to join the nuclear club, and instead became an early and enthusiastic supporter of non-proliferation and the nuclear test ban. Although the Liberal government of Lester B. Pearson accepted nuclear weapons for the Canadian Armed Forces in 1963, his government also determined that Canada's contribution to peacemaking was entirely dependent on deterrence and the United Nations system. 5 What this may mean in contemporary practice is that whatever role Canada may play in the Asia-Pacific is dependent at base on a certain modicum of strategic trust between the United States and China. Dating back to the Second World War, and reinforced through its NATO commitment, Canada has effectively limited its active defence commitments to the North Atlantic. Canada did not make an active contribution to the war in the Pacific between 1937 and 1945 (apart from a symbolic and ill-fated contribution to the defence of Hong Kong in 1941); the Canadian contribution to the war in Korea was strictly limited to the UN mission; and since the end of that war Canada has never maintained any military presence in the Western Pacific.
As a result, Canada has no armed forces to add to the evolving military balance in the Asia-Pacific. Whatever role we choose to play, must take into account both the interests of our senior ally and our lack of a clear interest in entanglement in the complex sovereignty disputes of East Asia. In both Northeast Asia and the South China Sea we did endeavour to carve a role as a facilitator, in the former case in developing a security architecture through Track II dialogue in the 1990s, and in the latter through seminars concerning the law of the sea and maritime dispute resolution. Those roles are now in abeyance and arguably have been superseded by events. Nonetheless, they are symptomatic of the kind of role that Canada can aspire to play. However, they require both active engagement and also the local partners with whom to weave a multilateral net. China has not seen fit to invite third parties into its New Great Power relationship with the United States; importantly, nor is Canada likely to elbow itself in.
Canada's intermittent commitment to the Western Pacific, its absence from the East Asian Summit, and its deference to the United States all inhibit middle power diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region. In complementary fashion, the lack of local leverage and regional alienation disables Canada in Chinese eyes as a partner of choice. China has made its regional priority clear, alongside its ambitions to play a preeminent role in Asia. 6 This set of priorities relegates Canada to a partnership of the second rank -unless the government in Ottawa can articulate a role as a partner at the global level that somehow wields equivalent leverage to the major powers of the UN Security Council (P5), the European Union, or China's partners within the tried a tack of "cool politics -warm economics" to the detriment of both aspects.
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It was not just that we condemned ourselves to reap thinner economic rewards from China's growing economy, we were also left grounded as China's boat sailed globally, locked into out G-7 corner as China consolidated a global role outside it. These trends became shatteringly evident with the onset of the Great Recession in 2008. 9 In the aftermath, we were neither essential to the Obama administration's Asian pivot, nor did we acquire a central stake in China's own "going out" globalization efforts. We slipped in importance to our senior ally and gained little purchase on the (re)new(ed) global colossus. In tandem, as China's global presence dawned on our own shores, Canadians were rudely awakened to Chinese influence in their own neighbourhood and in their own back yards. China was no longer across the world's widest ocean, it was present locally. None of America's allies were mentioned by name. 
Regrounding Middle Power Diplomacy
The key problem facing Canada is to reconcile the reality of the current global power structure with Canada's self-image. The issue is less a self-image out of touch with reality, but rather, an identity so ensconced in its history that has lost touch with the material supports that enabled it to play its historic role. It is more than a mismatch of values and capacity; it is a misplaced belief that values trump capacity, and blind to the ancillary powers that can enable Canada to play a global role.
Rule elaboration depends on close alignment with those willing and able to enforce those rules.
Both the willingness, and the capacity to enforce the order have been eroded. John Ikenberry argues that the order is so robust that effectively the rules are self enforcing, or rather, that the capacity for rule enforcement can be decentralized. 
Canada is Back?
Improvement in Sino-Canadian relations was a priority for Justin Trudeau even before he formally took office. 
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The Trudeau government's broader positioning on China was part and parcel of its general announcement that "Canada is Back" in international affairs. 23 The government made clear its intention to seek a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council, its intention to resume a significant role in peacekeeping and to play a positive role in climate negotiations, generally aligning itself with the internationalist orientation traditional to Canadian foreign policy.
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Improved bilateral relations with China were a key to assuming a more significant place in the world.
Enhanced bilateralism with China
Within weeks of taking office, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau met with China's President Xi
Jinping on the sidelines of APEC and the G-20. 
The Bilateral Agenda and the Broader Foreign Policy Agenda
Improved relations with China were an end in their own right -aimed at improved trade and investment, especially redressing the growing deficit in bilateral trade favoring China, but also were aimed at raising Canada's visibility in the Asia-Pacific, as well as a platform for improving Canada's profile in global governance. The Trudeau government signed the TPP -both to signal its support for multilateral trading arrangements and signal the priority of the Asia-Pacific, and
in that context to demonstrate that improved trade relations with China did not contradict continued support for its US ally and other Asia-Pacific nations.
To maintain support for his globalist international agenda as well as his economic agenda Trudeau hoped to finesse the issue by pledging a robust climate change program and environmental review while touting oil sands development as part of an "energy transition".
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In the lead-up to the Paris Climate talks, the Trudeau government therefore announced its intention to impose carbon pricing nationally.
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Despite forward momentum at the bilateral government level, public opinion appeared to lag, egged on by skeptical and sometimes hostile coverage in English-language national media. Some Canadians worry about coming under the dark sway of a dominant China. Whether this threat was real or not, officials of both Canada had Mexico had to hastily agree to renegotiate NAFTA.
The China Alternative
Nonetheless, the strength and persistence of Trump's challenges to Canada helped to temper the caution and ambivalent suspicion that some sectors of the Canadian public had viewed our relations with China.
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In his speech at the World Economic Forum at Davos Switzerland in January 2017 followed by a visit to the UN offices in Geneva China's President Xi Jinping, offered his own country as a platform for globalization global problem-solving and global governance. 
Conclusion: Patient Progress on a new Path
The Trudeau government is keenly aware that political and economic realities require Canada to steer the relationship with China on a steady course and aim institutionalize relations on an incremental basis with a free trade agreement as the initial goal.
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To do this successfully, the government hopes to keep all the stakeholders onside and move forward carefully and cautiously.
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The changed atmosphere occasioned by the election of Donald Trump in the US contains both dangers and opportunities. While the government has no choice but to defend our most important trading relationship, the evident capriciousness with which our closest partner engages us can only encourage Canadians to seek a steadying hand and alternative relations elsewhere. However, the energy required to maintain our existing relations may constrain our ability to reach out creatively and invest more fully in an emergent partnership with China. Furthermore, while Canadians are dismayed by the apparent abandonment of many of the values we counted on in our partnership with the US, they are not quite sure yet of the values that will sustain a closer partnership with China. Our interests may drive us closer together, but the leaders of both our countries need to find a further basis on which to deepen trust. This is a challenge for our own leaders but also a challenge for China as well as it lays out a "China solution."
Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgott and Kim Richard Nossal have argued that middlepowermanship cannot be divorced from leadership or followership. 65 The special role of the middle powers as catalysts, facilitators and managers -is played usually in between the great powers and lesser powers and almost always through the exercise of niche diplomacy. 66 The middle power role they identify normally occurs within a bloc, and always within a broader normative frame. That is why exercising middle power roles in relation to China is such a challenge.
Despite the evident differences in form, scope and historical context, it is worth comparing Xi Jinping's Signature program, "One Belt One Road" ((OBOR) to the Marshall Plan in terms of how Xi and China envision leadership. China has yet to articulate a coherent normative vision that middle managers can elaborate to their own advantage and to the advantage of smaller powers even as it holds our material incentives to participate in its orbit. Suspicion lingers that its commitment to the mechanism that sustained its own spectacular success in globalization is instrumental, but when faced with a US administration that has retreated to a purely transactional view of trade and diplomacy, Canada and other middle powers have few choices other than to take Chinese commitments at face value in hopes of sustaining the normative mesh that upheld the postwar order.
